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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether § 7002, the citizen suit provision of RCRA,
permits BRANU to institute a private cause of
action for restitution damages against NURD.
II. Whether NURD is liable to BRANU under RCRA
§ 7002 when no imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment
existed at the time the action was filed.
III. Whether it is constitutional for Congress under
the commerce clause to regulate NURD, a
company that has always performed its
business within one square mile of
Cathertown, and except for a truck and a roofing
product that once traveled interstate, uses local
supplies.
IV. Whether NURD is liable to EPA and BRANU
under CERCLA § 107 when it disposed of a
mixture of prepared roof acid and fruit juices
into a compost pit seven years prior to
BRANL's ownership of the Moll's Garden site.
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OPINION AND JUDGMENT BELOW
The opinion of the District Court of New Union is unpublished and appears in the record on appeal reproduced in Appendix A.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is waived pursuant to Rule IV(B)(3) of the
official rules for the 1996 Eighth Annual National Environmental Law Moot Court Competition.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
The constitutional provisions and statutes relevant to
the determination of the present case are listed in the Table
of Authorities and are reproduced in Appendix B.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of New Union, rendered April
23, 1995. The Brownfields Redevelopment Associates of New
Union ("BRANLTY) appeals from the District Court decision
denying them restitution damages from New Union Roofing
and Drywall ("NURD") under § 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") joins as amicus. Both
BRANU and EPA appeal from the District Court's decision
precluding them from recovering costs from NURD under
§ 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").
STATEMENT OF FACTS
New Union Roofing and Drywall ("NURD"), is a threeemployee company recognized for its quality of craftsmanship
and painstaking attention to detail. (R.2).1 All of NURD's
business is obtained through references from prior custom1. References denoted (R.) indicate the appropriate page of the decision of
the United States District Court for the District of New Union reproduced in
Appendix A.
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ers. (R.2). NURD has always performed its roofing business
within one square mile of the Moll's Garden neighborhood in
Cathertown. (R.2). NURD operated its business from a oneroom shed in Moll's Garden from 1981 until 1983. (R.3). The
modest shed was located on a lot adjacent to the home of
NURD's owner, Andrew Peterson. (R.3). In 1984, NURD
moved to a site in Cathertown's industrial area. (R.3).
As part of the roofing process, NURD prepared batches of
roof acid at the Moll's Garden site. (R.3). The prepared roof
acid is commonly used to ease the process of removing old
shingles. (R.3). One component of a prepared batch of roof
acid, is roof acid powder, which is manufactured exclusively
from natural ingredients, including several vegetable extracts. (R.3). In its powder form, roof acid is neither a listed
hazardous waste, nor a characteristic hazardous waste under
RCRA, a statute which EPA implements in New Union.
(R.3). Roof acid becomes a RCRA listed hazardous waste only
after water is added to the powder. (R.3). The parties agree
that Peterson and NURD employees did not know that prepared roof acid was a RCRA listed hazardous waste. (R.3).
The roof acid powder and the truck NURD used to transport the product were manufactured out of state but subsequently purchased by NURD from local merchants. (R.5).
The prices for these items and all other supplies were determined in a national market. (R.5). The other supplies used
by NURD were not only purchased, but also manufactured in
New Union. (R.5). In addition, the parties stipulate that
while NURD did not partake in any other interstate commerce, NURD's actions do have indirect effects on interstate
commerce to the same extent as any economic activity. (R.56).
NURD prepared 20 to 30 extra batches of roof acid during the three year period from 1981 through 1983. (R.3). It
was NURD's practice to mix the excess prepared roof acid
with leftover fruit juices from employee's lunches, leaves,
grass clippings and food scraps. The resulting mixture was
placed into a compost pit located behind the shed on the
Moll's Garden property. (R.3). The parties stipulate that the
resulting mixture did not qualify as a RCRA characteristic
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hazardous waste. The parties further agree that NURD employees mixed the prepared roof acid with their fruit juice in
good faith believing that it would add nutrients to the compost pit. (R.3). At no time was NURD in violation of any permit, zoning or applicable regulations. (R.4).
In 1990, after NURD relocated to the Cathertown industrial site, it sold the Moll's Garden property to plaintiff,
Brownfields Redevelopment Associates of New Union
("BRANU"). (R.3). BRANU is a three-employee corporation
whose purpose is to find former industrial type sites in
Cathertown, buy them and perform any necessary environmental remedial action. (R.3). Once the land is redeveloped,
BRANU sells the property for a profit. (R.3). BRANU has
previously remediated two sites: a dry cleaner and a gas station. (R.3).
As BRANU prepared the Moll's Garden site for redevelopment, a neighbor telephoned the EPA regional office and
described seeing NURD employees mixing prepared roof acid
with fruit juices and disposing of it in the compost pit. (R.4).
Peterson acknowledged that this had occurred, and both
NURD and BRANU cooperated with EPA's sampling of soils
and groundwater. (R.4). EPA spent $100,000 for such sampling and follow-up analysis. (R.4). Its report concluded that
some soil was sufficiently contaminated to pose a harm,
"should the site be used as a residential property or other
land use in which soil contact by individuals is likely." (R.4).
However, EPA stated that, "as the property is currently in
the ownership of a land redevelopment company, federal action to remediate the soil is not necessary at this time." (R.4).
Three years later, BRANU remediated the site at a cost of
$200,000. (R.4).
After remediation, BRANU sought compensation for its
response costs by commencing an action under RCRA § 7002
and CERCLA §107 in the United States District Court for the
District of New Union. (R.4). EPA simultaneously instituted
an action under CERCLA § 107, seeking recovery of its sampling and analysis costs from NURD. (R.4). The two cases
have been consolidated, and EPA participates in the RCRA
issues as an amicus. (R.4).

9
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The District Court concluded that although Congress
was within its power to enact RCRA § 7002, NURD was not
liable under this section because § 7002 does not create a private cause of action for restitution. (R.6). Moreover, the
court held that NURD was not liable to either BRANU or
EPA under CERCLA § 107 because NURD did not dispose of
a CERCLA hazardous substance. (R.8).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
BRANU may not recover its cleanup costs under RCRA
§ 7002 because this section only grants citizens injunctive relief. The plain language of the statute and its legislative history evidence Congress' intent to limit the remedies available
to citizens to injunctive relief. Since the statute explicitly
provides for this form of remedy, it would be improper to imply any additional remedies. Therefore, BRANU may not recover restitution damages given that this remedy does not
exist under § 7002.
BRANU is also barred from recovering under § 7002
since this section requires a finding of imminent and substantial endangerment to health and the environment. An imminent endangerment means a present or future threat to the
environment. As BRANU remediated the site prior to filing
this action, there is no imminent threat to the environment.
Thus, BRANU cannot recover under RCRA § 7002.
Furthermore, NURD is not liable to BRANU because section 7002, as applied to NURD, is unconstitutional since it
exceeds Congress' power to regulate under the commerce
clause. Congress has failed to show how hazardous waste
substantially affects interstate commerce. Even in the aggregate, small amounts of waste disposed of by companies like
NURD do not substantially affect interstate commerce. As no
substantial affect exists, § 7002 impermissibly allows Congress to interfere with the regulations of land use, an area of
traditional state concern. Additionally, since § 7002, as applied to NURD, regulates a local business and is not an essential part of RCRA's larger regulatory scheme, Congress has
exceeded its regulatory power.
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Congress also may not regulate NURD because NURD is
not a business that partakes of interstate commerce.
NURD's only connection to interstate commerce is that its
truck once traveled in interstate commerce, and some of its
products, although locally manufactured and sold, have national markets. If Congress could regulate based on these
tenuous connections to interstate commerce, its power under
the commerce clause would have no limit. Furthermore, the
roof acid powder was not a product subject to regulation by
Congress after it reached the Moll's Garden site. Once a
product shipped through interstate commerce reaches its "final destination," it loses its interstate quality. Therefore,
§ 7002 as applied to NURD is unconstitutional.
In addition, NURD is not liable to either EPA or BRANU
under CERCLA § 107. Under CERCLA § 107, NURD would
be liable if it disposed of a "hazardous substance" on the
Moll's Garden site. This condition was not met. When
NURD disposed of the prepared roof acid mixed with fruit
juice, food scraps and grass clippings, it was not disposing of
a CERCLA hazardous substance as defined in RCRA. When
a listed waste, such as prepared roof acid, is mixed with other
nonhazardous wastes, like fruit juices and food scraps, it no
longer constitutes a listed hazardous waste. Moreover,
NURD's mixture was not hazardous because the EPA's mixture rule was unenforceable from 1981 until 1983 when
NURD disposed of its mixture. Consequently, NURD cannot
be held liable because its conduct does not fall within the
scope of CERCLA § 107.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CITIZEN SUIT PROVISION OF RCRA
CANNOT BE INTERPRETED TO IMPLY A
PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
RESTITUTION DAMAGES SINCE IT ONLY
PROVIDES FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

The plain language of RCRA § 7002 does not, explicitly
or implicitly, provide a private cause of action for the recovery

11
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of cleanup costs. The statute's legislative history also demonstrates that Congress did not intend to provide such a remedy. Rather, the remedies provided by the statute to private
parties are limited to injunctive relief. Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 315 (6th Cir. 1985). In interpreting a statute, a court must first examine the plain language
of the statute. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). When a private
cause of action for damages is at issue, a court's statutory
analysis must specifically focus on the plain language of the
enforcement and relief provisions. Middlesex Cty. Sewerage
Auth. v. National Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981). In
addition, a court must examine the legislative history to determine whether Congress intended to include a private
cause of action for a remedy in a particular statute. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981). If, however, a
statute expressly provides a remedy, courts must be careful
not to infer additional remedies from the plain language of
the statute. TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). Neither the plain language nor the
legislative history of RCRA § 7002 manifest an intent by Congress to provide a private cause of action for restitution damages. Furthermore, as injunctive relief is explicitly provided
for, additional remedies should not be implied. Hence, in following the guidelines set out by the Supreme Court, no implied remedy for restitution damages exists under § 7002.
Accordingly, BRANU cannot institute a private cause of action for restitution damages against NURD.
Analysis of the statute's plain meaning in this case demonstrates that the only available remedy afforded citizens
under § 7002 is through injunctive relief. See, e.g., Furrerv.
Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1097 (8th Cir. 1995); PortmouthRedev.
& Housing Auth. v. BMI Apartments Assocs., 874 F. Supp.
380, 385 (E.D. Va. 1994); Gache v. Town of Harrison N.Y,
813 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Fallowfield Dev.
Corp. v. Strunk, Nos. CIV. A. 89-8644, CIV. A. 90-4431, 1993
WL 157723, *14-15 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 1993); Commerce Holding Co. v. Buckstone, 749 F. Supp. 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
Section 7002 does not include recovery for cleanup costs or
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any other form of damages. Thus, the statute on its face does
not give district courts explicit authority to reimburse plaintiffs for costs incurred in cleaning up contaminated sites. Id.
at 1096. Instead, it "confers limited jurisdiction" to district
courts to grant injunctive relief in the form of an order to the
responsible party to take remedial action or to restrain prohibited conduct. Walls, 761 F.2d at 315.
The purpose of § 7002 is to encourage citizens to act as
private attorneys general by complimenting federal enforcement of environmental regulations. See Environmental Def
Fund v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1983). When
citizens act as attorneys general, they are protecting the public welfare, and therefore should only be entitled to remedies
benefitting the public. The statute affords such a remedy by
permitting citizens to obtain injunctions to abate an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a)(1)(B) (1984). Allowing a private
party to recover restitution damages would be inconsistent
with the purpose of § 7002 because it would not benefit the
general public, but the private litigant instead. Accordingly,
BRANU is not entitled to restitution damages, given that
RCRA § 7002 only allows for injunctive relief when a citizen
sues as a private attorney general.
Furthermore, a court may not read other remedies into a
statute that expressly provides for a particular remedy or
remedies. Transamerica,444 U.S. at 19. Congress explicitly
articulated the remedies available under RCRA for noncompliance with its rules and regulations. Both private citizens
and EPA may obtain temporary or permanent injunctions
through a civil action in a federal district court. Also, the
statute provides that EPA may suspend or revoke permits,
impose civil penalties, and bring criminal actions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(a)-(d) (1986). In addition to articulating enforceable
remedies, Congress addressed monetary considerations by
explicitly providing for the award of litigation costs to the
prevailing parties. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e). These explicit governmental actions indicate that it is unlikely that "Congress
absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action"
such as restitution damages. Cannon v. University of Chi-
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cago, 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). Hence,
as § 7002 only permits injunctive relief for private parties,
BRANU is not entitled to a monetary award.
Permitting a private cause of action for restitution damages under RCRA § 7002 would be contrary to Congress' intent. In determining whether Congress intended to include a
private cause of action in a statute, a court must consider
whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose "especial" benefit the statute was enacted, and whether the legislative history explicitly or implicitly indicates an intent to
create or deny a private remedy. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975). In the instant case, both of these questions must be
answered in the negative. Therefore, BRANU cannot recover
cleanup costs because Congress did not give it a means to do
SO.
First, since the purpose of RCRA is to benefit the entire
citizenship through the protection of the resources of the
United States, it follows that Congress did not intend to create a special class of beneficiaries under § 7002. When a statute grants an individual the right to bring a private cause of
action for the benefit of the public at large, courts are reluctant to imply a private cause of action which benefits only a
private litigant. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693 n.13. In RCRA's
stated objectives, Congress declared "it to be the national policy of the United States that... the generation of hazardous
waste is to be reduced or eliminated.., so as to minimize the
present and future threat to human health and the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1984). Thus, the benefit of enacting RCRA "inures to all citizens of the United States."
Furrer,62 F.3d at 1095. Therefore, the class for which RCRA
was enacted encompasses the entire population of the United
States. Moreover, just because the statute confers upon each
citizen the "right to bring suit in the federal courts to compel
enforcement of RCRA's provisions," it does not establish an
"especial benefit" for property owners who seek recovery of
cleanup costs for soil contamination. Id. Thus, BRANU, as a
private litigant, cannot prevail because the remedy provided
in § 7002 was intended to benefit the entire population.
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Second, the legislative history of § 7002 does not speak to
the issue of a private cause of action for restitution damages.
In light of this, it is not necessary to inquire as to whether
implying a cause of action would further the purpose of the
statute. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 574576 (1979) (acknowledging that this inquiry, first set out in
Cort v. Ash, is not relevant if the legislative history does not
address the issue of private remedies). The Supreme Court
has recognized that courts must be careful not to imply additional remedies when a statute provides for a remedy. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19. RCRA already provides for the
remedy of injunctive relief. The legislative history of RCRA
specifically states that RCRA's citizen suit provision "confer[s] on citizens a limited right.., to sue to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment." H.R. Rep. No. 198,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 53 (1983). Congress has characterized citizen suit provisions as abatement or injunctive
measures. Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49,
61 (1987). Hence, when a citizen sues "to abate" a condition
violative of RCRA's regulations, an injunction is the only possible relief. Furrer,62 F.3d at 1098. Accordingly, no cause of
action for damages can be implied since an express remedy
for injunctive relief exists. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19.
Since there is no explicit or implicit intent by Congress to allow for a private cause of action to recover cleanup costs,
BRANU cannot recover cleanup costs.
In addition, the legislative history of the enforcement
provision in RCRA § 7002 illustrates that no private cause of
action for restitution damages exists. The enforcement provision of the statute allows the District Court "to order.., such
other actions as may be necessary" to enforce the regulations
promulgated by the RCRA. 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(2). While the
legislative history of § 7002 does not specifically address this
phrase, Congress qualified the reach of this provision when
discussing § 7003. John E. Sullivan, Implied Private Causes
of Action and the Recoverability of Damages Under the RCRA
Citizen Suit Provision,25 Envtl. L. Rep. 10408 (August 1995);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1984). The history of § 7003 indicates that the enforcement provision refers to authority
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granted to federal courts to order the responsible party to
take whatever action is necessary to correct the violation. Id.
These actions include "short- and long-term injunctive relief,
ranging from the construction of dikes to the adoption of certain treatment technologies, upgrading of disposal facilities,
and removal and incineration." United States v. Price, 688
F.2d 204, 213 (3rd Cir. 1982) (citing H.R. Committee Print
No. 96-IFC 31, 96th Congress, 1st Sess., at 32 (1979)). Notably, there is no reference to recovery for cleanup costs or any
other forms of damages in the legislative history of either
§ 7002 or § 7003. Since courts are not authorized to ignore
legislative judgment, and since a review of RCRA's legislative
history demonstrates that Congress did not contemplate an
implied private cause of action for restitution damages, no
such action exists. See Middlesex County Sewage Auth., 453
U.S. at 18.
The above analysis is consistent with a recent Eighth
Circuit decision that contains facts mirroring those in the instant case. In Furrerv. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir.
1995), landowners who were ordered to remediate their property sought to recover their cleanup costs from prior owners.
The court used the guidelines established by the Supreme
Court in Cort v. Ash to determine whether Congress intended
to authorize a monetary remedy to private citizens in § 7002.
Furrer,62 F.3d at 1094. The court concluded that the language of § 7002 demonstrates that it was not enacted for the
special benefit of those in the Furrer's situation. Id. at 1095.
In fact, the court pointed out that RCRA and § 7002 are specifically directed against owners of property where contamination presents an imminent and substantial endangerment.
Id. at 1095. The Furrer's fell within this class of landowners.
Id. at 1095.
Further, after analyzing the statute's plain language, the
court in Furrerstated that § 7002 specifically authorizes federal courts to grant injunctive relief and does not "contemplate the payment of money to a party who already has
cleaned up a contaminated site." Id. at 1096-97. In finding
this express remedy, the court concluded that Congress has
"clearly provided" for restitution damages in other federal en-
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vironmental laws and "deliberately did not do so in this instance." Id. at 1096. The court denied the Furrer's claim for
recovery of cleanup costs, concluding that the statute specifically authorized injunctive relief. Since the Furrer's were unable to establish any Congressional intent to create a private
cause of action for the recovery of cleanup costs, there was no
justification to infer such a remedy under § 7002. Id. at 1102.
Additionally, in Furrer,the Eighth Circuit persuasively
criticized KFC W. Inc. v. Mehring, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir.
1995), a recent Ninth Circuit decision authorizing recovery of
cleanup costs under § 7002. The Ninth Circuit misconstrued
two Eighth Circuit cases which addressed whether EPA can
recover response costs. Id. at 1100. First, the Ninth Circuit
incorrectly relied on United States v. NortheasternPharm. &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 738 (8th Cir. 1986), because, in that
case, the Eighth Circuit never reached the issue of recovery of
response costs available to the government under § 7003.
Second, the Ninth Circuit relied on United States v. Aceto
Agricultural Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989), and
concluded that since citizens suits are almost identical to
EPA suits, citizen suits should permit cleanup costs. The
court, however, applied reasoning pertinent to EPA suits to
justify its findings with regard to citizen suits. This reasoning is flawed. Private litigants, unlike the government, cannot pursue a cause of action under the EPA suit provision for
post-abatement recovery costs. Id. at 1383. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 693, n. 13 (1979), explained that an implied cause of
action in favor of the United States may be allowed in cases
"where the statute creates a duty in favor of the public at
large." This proposition does not suggest that a private party
has the same privilege.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's opinion incorrectly interpreted Congress' legislative intent when enacting § 7002.
The Court cited to H.R. Rep. No. 198, and indicated in dicta
that "the legislative history cuts both ways because .. language [stating that citizens have a limited right to sue to
abate] supports the [defendant's] contention that Congress
intended to allow citizens to sue only for injunctions when it
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added the endangerment provision." KFC W., 49 F.3d at 522.
However, the language in the legislative history indicates
that a citizen's right to sue is based on the standards of liability found under § 7003 and that citizens are not entitled to
the same remedies available to EPA under § 7003. Furrer,62
F.3d at 1101. The Ninth Circuit obviously ignored legislative
intent in reaching its conclusion when interpreting § 7002.
In light of § 7002's plain language and its legislative history,
it is difficult to justify the Ninth Circuit's decision to allow for
restitution of cleanup costs in a citizens suit.
BRANU, in its attempt to recover cleanup costs for property formerly owned by NURD, clearly misinterpreted the
meaning and intent of RCRA § 7002. RCRA § 7002 does not
explicitly provide for restitution of cleanup costs, and there is
no implicit intention in the legislative history indicating that
such recovery was considered by Congress. In asserting an
implied private cause of action in § 7002, BRANU disregards
well-established canons of statutory construction as well as
long-standing Supreme Court decisions which give guidance
to the proper interpretation of statutes. RCRA does not provide BRANU with the remedy it desires. The only remedy
BRANU could possibly be granted is injunctive relief. However, this is impossible since BRANU remediated the Moll's
Garden site prior to bringing this action. Since RCRA § 7002
only offers injunctive relief to restrain someone from acting or
to force someone to act, issuing an injunction against NURD
at this time would be absurd.
Finally, allowing BRANU to recover its cleanup costs
under RCRA § 7002 would not fulfill the intended purpose of
the statute, which is to encourage private citizens to act as
attorney generals for the overall community's good.
BRANU's sole purpose for suing NURD is to recover the costs
it incurred when it cleaned up the Moll's Garden site for its
own development and profit making purposes. When these
factors are examined, it is clear that the District Court correctly held that BRANU cannot recover its cleanup costs from
NURD under RCRA.
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II. BRANU HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
RCRA § 7002 BECAUSE NO "IMMINENT AND
SUBSTANTIAL ENDANGERMENT" TO
HEALTH OR THE ENVIRONMENT
EXISTS.
BRANU is barred from recovering under § 7002 because
it remediated the Moll's Garden site prior to filing this action
and eliminated any possible dangers to the environment. To
succeed in a RCRA claim, a plaintiff must establish that the
condition at the site in question "present[s] an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the health or the environment."
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Courts interpreting this phrase
have held that the statute can only be used to bring an action
for events "which took place in the past but which continue to
present a threat." United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213
(3rd Cir. 1982). If a court allows a citizen suit to be brought
after the site has been remediated, the court would be ignoring the express purpose of RCRA to eliminate any risk to
health or the environment. Coalition for Health Concerns v.
LWD, Inc., 834 F.Supp. 953, 957 (W.D. Ky. 1993). Thus, allowing BRANU to institute a suit against NURD after it has
remediated the contaminated site would subvert the intent
and meaning of"imminent and substantial endangerment" as
used in RCRA § 7002.
The legislative history of RCRA indicates that Congress
relied on the definition of imminence found in § 7003 when it
amended § 7002. See Middlesex Cty. Bd.of Chosen Freeholders v. State of N.J., Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 645 F. Supp.
715, 721 (D.N.J. 1986). Section 7003 defines "imminence" as
applying "to the nature of the threat rather than identification of the time when the endangerment initially arose."
United States v. Waste Industries,Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 166 (4th
Cir. 1984)(quoting H.R. Rep No. 31, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32
(Comm. Print 1979) (Eckhardt Report). The nature of the
threat refers to the capacity of the harm to be inflicted on the
environment in the present or in the future, even though the
action causing the harm occurred sometime in the past. Further, imminence does not require that actual harm exist; in-
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stead, a risk of threatened harm only needs to be present.
Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1356 (2d Cir.
1991). Therefore, actions under § 7002 can only be instituted
if the contamination causing the harm remains present, even
if the action which caused the harm has ceased. The action
which caused the endangerment at the Moll's Garden site occurred in the past, but the contamination was remediated
prior to the commencement of the present suit. Therefore,
BRANU cannot sustain its claim under § 7002.
Furthermore, the purpose of RCRA is to promote the
protection of health and the environment through the abatement of practices harmful to the general well being of citizens. Id. at 1356; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6902. Citizen suit
provisions are often characterized as "abatement" provisions
by Congress. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61. Abatement is defined
as "a reduction, a decrease, or diminution

. . .

suspension or

cessation." Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edition (1990). Allowing recovery after a harm has been eliminated would contravene Congress' characterization of citizen suit provisions
.as abatement provisions. Thus, courts hold that a complaint
brought under RCRA's citizen suit provision requesting an
abatement must allege that the harm is continuing in nature,
McClellan Ecological Seepage v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp.
1182, 1187 (E.D. Ca. 1988); Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59, and the
plaintiff must actually prove that harm exists. Murray v.
Bath Iron Works Corp., 867 F. Supp. 33, 41 (D. Me. 1994). In
this case, BRANU does not have a cause of action under
RCRA § 7002 because at the time it filed this action, it had
already remediated the site. Therefore, it could neither allege that the harm was continuing in nature nor prove that
the harm existed.
In addition, case law supports the position that NURD is
not liable to BRANU since the site did not pose any danger
when BRANU filed suit. The Second Circuit in Dague v. City
of Burlington,935 F.2d at 1356, recognized that since an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment" existed when the suit was filed, the plaintiff was
not precluded from obtaining injunctive relief. Dague reiterates that the Congressional purpose behind RCRA § 7002 is
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to abate existing situations which pose "imminent and substantial endangerment." Id. Similarly, in Gache v. Town of
Harrison,813 F. Supp. 1037, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), the District Court, in determining whether the contamination of a
landfill continued to pose a present threat, stated that "Congress intended to allow citizen suits under § 7002 of RCRA
for past violations where the effects of the violation remain
remediable." As a result, the court concluded that "the disposal of wastes can constitute a continuing violation as long as
no proper disposal procedures are put into effect or as long as
the waste has not been cleaned up." Id. at 1042.
In the present case, BRANU cannot establish the existence of a threatened or potential harm as required by § 7002.
BRANU cleaned up the contamination, thereby abating the
"imminent and substantial endangerment" to health and the
environment. Consequently, there is no violation of RCRA
§ 7002. Allowing BRANU to recover after the contamination
has been removed from the property would be contrary to the
purpose and intent of the Act, which is to protect the health
of the general public. Therefore, this Court should affirm the
District Court's decision that NURD is not liable to BRANU
under RCRA § 7002.
III.

SECTION 7002 OF RCRA IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO
NURD BECAUSE THE ACT WHEN
APPLIED EXCEEDS CONGRESS' POWER
TO REGULATE UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE.

RCRA as applied to NURD is unconstitutional because it
is not within the scope of Congress' regulatory power. The
Constitution grants Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states,
and among the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
This enables Congress to regulate any activities that have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce, the channels
through which interstate commerce flow, and the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or people or things in inter-
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state commerce. United States v. Lopez, - U.S.-, 115 S.Ct.
1624, 1629 (1995). Congress may also regulate purely intrastate activities if, in the aggregate, the intrastate activity
substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. at 1631. In addition, if the regulation of the intrastate activity is essential
to a regulatory scheme enacted by Congress, Congress has
the power to intervene. Id. Thus, Congress' power to regulate under the commerce clause, is not unlimited. Id. at 1628.
The scope of the commerce clause
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects
on interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local and create a completely centralized
government.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
NURD and others similarly situated do not substantially affect interstate commerce in the aggregate. Also, their regulation is not an essential part of the regulatory scheme set out
in RCRA. Therefore, RCRA §7002 is unconstitutional as applied to NURD.
A. NURD's disposal of a small quantity of waste, coupled
with that of other intrastatebusinesses, does not have
a substantialaffect on interstate commerce.
Congress may regulate intrastate activity if that activity,
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
Jones & Laughlin, 310 U.S. at 37. However, Congress cannot
use trivial effects on interstate commerce to regulate private
activities. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196, n. 27 (1968).
In evaluating whether an intrastate activity substantially affects interstate commerce, courts will consider whether Congress is intruding in areas of traditional state concern. See
Lopez, U.S. , 115 S.Ct. at 1632. The courts may hold a
specific act of Congressional regulation invalid if Congress
regulates a local activity, thereby giving Congress a general
police power traditionally reserved to the states. Id. at 1634.
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Section 7002 of RCRA as applied to NURD regulates an intrastate activity that in the aggregate does not substantially
affect interstate commerce and is an area of traditional state
concern. Therefore, §7002 as applied to NURD is
unconstitutional.
NURD's disposal of the prepared roof acid and fruit juice
mixture on the Moll's Garden site does not substantially affect interstate commerce. This is supported by the Supreme
Court's reasoning in United States v. Lopez, - U.S. __, 115
S.Ct. 1624 (1995). In Lopez, the Court held that in order for
Congress to regulate an intrastate activity that activity must
do more than just affect interstate commerce. Id. at 1930. It
must substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. In applying this standard, the Court struck down as unconstitutional
§ 922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, which made
it a federal crime to knowingly possess a firearm within 1000
feet of a school zone. Id. at 1626. The Court determined that,
in the aggregate, possession of a gun in a school zone was not
an economic activity that substantially affected interstate
commerce. Id. at 1631.
In addition, there were no findings by Congress demonstrating that possession of a gun in a school zone substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. The Court refused to
acknowledge the existence of a substantial relationship, fearful of granting Congress an unlimited power to regulate
under the commerce clause. Id. at 1632. Moreover, the Court
was particularly unwilling to allow this expansion of the commerce clause given that § 922(q) sought to regulate criminal
activity, an area of traditional state concern. Id. at 1634.
This would inevitably destroy the constitutional balance between what is truly local and what is truly national. Id.
The instant case is similar to Lopez. The Congressional
findings contained in RCRA do not indicate how solid and
hazardous wastes substantially affect interstate commerce.
John P. Dwyer, The Commerce Clause and the Limits of Congressional Authority to Regulate the Environment, 25 Envtl.
L. Rep. 10408 (August, 1995). The findings indicate that
there has been an increase in the amount of solid wastes for
urban areas due to an increase and improvement in manufac-
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turing, packaging, and marketing of consumer products. 42
U.S.C. § 6901(a)(1),(2) (1992). According to Congress, the disposal of solid waste has become a problem that is national in
scope and requires Federal action. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4).
For instance, Congress has found that hazardous waste can
present a danger to human heath and the environment. 42
U.S.C. § 6901(b)(2). Despite these findings, nowhere in this
section does Congress state how intrastate waste has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Furthermore, like the defendant's conduct in Lopez,
NURD's actions do not substantially affect interstate commerce. First, the potential harm that was created when
NURD disposed of the prepared roof acid mixture was contained at the Moll's Garden site. EPA concluded that the
mixture was only a threat should an individual come in direct
contact with the soil. Thus, the harm that could have resulted from the waste would not have had any affect on interstate commerce because it was contained on the land.
Furthermore, the waste disposed of by NURD, in combination with other intrastate businesses, does not, in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce. In Lopez, U.S.

-,

115 S.Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995), the government argued

that gun possession would substantially affect interstate
commerce because people would be unwilling to travel to areas within the country that they perceived were unsafe. The
Court declined to consider this a substantial effect. In light of
Lopez, the effects in the instant case are not a substantial.
Although in the aggregate NURD's disposal of the mixture of prepared roof acid and fruit juice, combined with
waste disposed of by other similarly situated businesses, affects land value, this effect does not substantially impact interstate commerce. If Congress could permissibly regulate
any activity because it affected land value, Congress' power
under the commerce clause would have no limit. In Lopez,
the Court declined to expand Congress' power to such an extent, because to do so would permit Congress to interfere in
an area of regulation reserved for the states under the Constitution. Id. at 1634. Similarly, NURD's impact on land
value, in the aggregate, does not substantially affect inter-
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state commerce, given that RCRA § 7002 regulates land use,
an area of state concern. See Lewis v. BT Investment, 447
U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (holding that the states retain authority
under their general police powers to regulate matters of legitimate states concern). To hold otherwise would upset the
constitutional balance between what is local and what is national. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 194-95 (1824).
Therefore, since RCRA § 7002 as applied significantly
changes the balance of federal-state power, and since Congress failed to make any findings concerning the nexus between hazardous waste and interstate commerce, this Court
should find RCRA as applied to NURD unconstitutional.
Additionally, the instant case is distinguishable from Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn., Inc.,
452 U.S. 264 (1981), where, in response to a constitutional
challenge to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
["SMCRA"], the Supreme Court found that Congress rationally concluded that surface mining had an effect on interstate
commerce. In reaching its decision, the Court specifically
looked at the Congressional findings in SMCRA, as well as
the extensive legislative history concerning surface mining
and its effects on interstate commerce. Id. at 277-80. The association of coal producers who challenged SMCRA argued
that, since the Act regulated land use, a local activity, the
Court should not defer to Congress' finding. Id. at 281-82.
The Court rejected this argument concluding that "Congress
may regulate the conditions under which goods shipped in interstate commerce are produced where the 'local' activity of
producing these goods itself affects interstate commerce." Id.
at 281.
Although Congress has concluded that surface mining as
regulated under SMCRA has an impact on interstate commerce, it has made no such findings concerning the impact of
solid and hazardous waste. Also, SMCRA involves the regulation of coal mining, an industry that by its nature sends
goods into interstate commerce. Unlike the coal mines in Hodel, NURD has no direct ties to interstate commerce and does
not ship any goods out of state. While SMCRA was facially
challenged, RCRA § 7002 is unconstitutional only as applied
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to NURD. This distinction is relevant considering the Court's
reasoning in Hodel that "courts have uniformly found the
power conferred by the Commerce Clause is broad enough to
permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or
water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may
have had effects in more than one state." Id. at 282. This
reasoning cannot be applied in the instant case because the
substance that NURD disposed of did not have the potential
to affect any other state. Therefore, unlike the statute in Hodel, RCRA as applied to NURD is unconstitutional.
B. Section 7002, as applied to NURD, is not an essential
element of RCRA's regulatory scheme.
RCRA's regulatory scheme will not be undercut if
NURD's intrastate activity goes unregulated. Congressional
regulation of purely local activity, although not normally
within the scope of the commerce clause, is constitutional if
the regulation of the local activity is an essential part of a
larger regulatory scheme. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
197 (1968). An essential part of a larger regulatory scheme is
one which, if absent, would undercut the effect of the regulatory scheme. See Lopez, U.S._, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. Section
7002 as applied to NURD is not an essential part of RCRA.
Congress' motive in enacting RCRA was primarily to decrease adverse effects caused by hazardous waste on human
health and the environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a). RCRA,
as a whole, achieves this goal. If § 7002 is limited in its application to businesses or persons engaged in or affecting interstate commerce, the purpose of RCRA would not be undercut.
A Congressional goal is only achievable to the extent that
it is within the scope of the commerce clause. If, however,
Congress is permitted to regulate a local activity only because
it furthers a Congressional goal, Congress' power under the
commerce clause will have no limit. In this case, the application of § 7002 to NURD may further Congress' goal of protecting health and the environment. RCRA's purpose, however,
would not be undercut if it is solely applied to businesses engaged in or affecting interstate commerce, thereby excluding
NURD. A harmful substance disposed of intrastate will not
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substantially affect health and the environment. Excluding
this small amount of waste from RCRA's scope would not undercut Congress' intentions because most hazardous waste
would still be regulated under RCRA. Accordingly, § 7002 as
applied to NURD's activity is not an essential part of RCRA.
C. NURD's activity has only a tenuous connection to
interstatecommerce.
Congress cannot regulate the mixture of prepared roof
acid fruit juice simply because the roof acid powder once
passed across state lines. Although Congress may regulate
items that move in interstate commerce, Lopez, __U.S. , 115
S.Ct. at 1629, Congress may not reach a product once the
product arrives at its final destination. See Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943) (acknowledging that
the test of whether an item is still in interstate commerce for
the purposes of federal regulation is whether the item moving
in interstate commerce had reached its "final destination" or
whether it was merely at an interim stop in the process of
getting the item to its final destination); Higgins v. CarrBros.
Co., 317 U.S. 572 (1943) (holding that a business' employees
were not subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act because the
products that the business received ceased to be with the
channels of interstate commerce as they had reached their
final destination). When the roof acid was delivered to
NURD, it had reached its "final destination." The acid was
subsequently used only intrastate. Thus, there is no doubt
that the roof acid, once received by NURD, lost its quality as
an interstate item and was no longer subject to regulation by
Congress.
Moreover, the roof acid did not become an item that can
be regulated by RCRA until after reaching its final destination in New Union. The roof acid powder did not constitute a
hazardous waste under RCRA until it was mixed with water
at the Moll's Garden site. Prior to this alteration, the substance was not even an item that Congress chose to regulate
under RCRA. Therefore, the prepared roof acid cannot be
regulated by Congress under the commerce clause.
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Congress also cannot regulate NURD's mixture based on
an assumption that NURD is a business that partakes in interstate commerce. The only connection that NURD has to
interstate commerce is that its truck was shipped in interstate commerce, and some supplies it uses have national markets. However, these indirect ties to interstate commerce do
not bring NURD within Congress' regulatory sphere under
the commerce clause. If Congress is permitted to regulate
items that once passed state lines or possess a national market base, there would be no end to Congress' power under the
commerce clause. Therefore, the truck and supplies owned
by NURD do not give Congress the power to regulate the hazardous waste produced by NURD. Furthermore, Congress
cannot regulate NURD simply because its employees can use
their salaries to buy interstate products. This connection to
interstate commerce is also tenuous. As a result, § 7002 as
applied to NURD is unconstitutional.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY
DETERMINED THAT NURD CANNOT BE
LIABLE UNDER CERCLA § 107 SINCE IT
DID NOT DISPOSE OF A "HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCE."
When NURD employees placed a mixture of prepared
roof acid, fruit juice, leaves, grass clippings and food scraps
into a compost pit on its Moll's Gardens cite, they were not
disposing of a "hazardous substance" under CERCLA. CERCLA § 107(a) holds liable "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed
of." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1992). The plain language of the
statute dictates that in order for a past owner to be held liable, a hazardous substance must have been disposed of on the
site during the period of ownership of the past owner. Id.
Consequently, NURD is not liable for response costs to either
EPA or BRANU under CERCLA § 107 because the mixture
NURD disposed of during 1981 through 1983 was not a CERCIA hazardous substance.
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A "hazardous substance" under CERCLA § 101(14) is defined as one which has been identified as hazardous in other
environmental statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1992). The
parties agree that the only statute through which the mixture might be hazardous is RCRA. 2 Pursuant to RCRA, EPA
promulgated rules governing the management of "hazardous
waste." 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1984); 40 C.F.R. 261 (1993). The
definition of hazardous waste includes characteristic hazardous wastes and listed wastes. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3. If a waste
fails certain EPA-approved regulatory tests, it is labeled a
characteristic hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261, subpart C.
A waste is a listed hazardous waste if it appears on one of the
three regulatory lists implemented by EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 261,
subpart D. The parties agree that the only provision through
which the mixture might be a hazardous substance is
through its listing as a RCRA hazardous waste.
In 1980, prepared roof acid was listed as a hazardous
waste under RCRA. NURD did not, however, dispose of prepared roof acid. Rather, it disposed of a mixture of prepared
roof acid and fruit juice left over from lunch, which was prepared in good faith to add nutrients to a compost pit. When,
as in the instant case, a listed hazardous waste is mixed with
other solid wastes, it no longer constitutes a listed waste.
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 38 F.3d 862 (7th Cir.
1994). "[W]ithout a separate rule specifying that such mixtures are hazardous, the language of the listing itself fails to
reach such mixtures." Id. Accordingly, NURD is not liable
because, at the time it disposed of the mixture of prepared
roof acid and fruit juices, it was not disposing of a listed hazardous waste.
The only avenue by which NURD's mixture could be designated as a hazardous waste is through the EPA's "mixture
rule." The mixture rule provides that a waste shall be managed as hazardous if it is a combination of a solid waste and
any listed hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(iv). How2. CERCLA § 101(14) also designates as a "hazardous substance" any substance EPA has designated for special consideration under the Clean Air Act,
Clean Water Act or Toxic Substances Control Act.
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ever, the mixture rule, although initially issued in 1980, did
not have any legal effect until its repromulgation in 1992.
This delay is attributed to the D.C. Circuit's 1991 decision in
Shell Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 950 F.2d
741 (D.C. Cir. 1991), to "vacate" and "set aside" the mixture
rule. In Shell Oil, the court found that EPA violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") when it failed to provide
notice and an opportunity for public comment before issuing
the rule in 1980. Consequently, the mixture rule was invalidated on procedural grounds and remanded to EPA. Id. at
752. As a result of Shell Oil, the mixture rule has been
treated by courts as if it had not been issued until 1992.
United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380
(8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Recticel Foam Corp., 858 F.
Supp. 726 (E.D. Tenn. 1993); In re Hardin County, OH, No.
RCRA-V-W-89-R-29, RCRA (3008) Appeal No. 93-1, 1994
RCRA LEXIS 36 (ALJ, April, 12, 1994); In re Amoco Oil Co.,
RCRA No. 111-225, 1993 WL 426068 (ALJ, Sept. 15, 1993).
The language of Shell Oil is consistent with the interpretation that the mixture rule was not applicable until 1992.
The Shell Oil court stated that the mixture rule was "vacated" and "set aside." 950 F.2d at 752. "To 'vacate,' as the
parties should well know, means 'to annul; to cancel or rescind; to declare, to make or to render void; to defeat; to deprive of force; to make of no authority or validity; to set
aside.'" Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
713 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). Thus,
it is apparent that the court intended that the mixture rule
be unenforceable from its initial issuance in 1980 until its
repromulgation in 1992.
Furthermore, a retroactive application of the decision in
Shell Oil is consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
The Supreme Court eliminated a modified prospective approach and concluded that full retroactivity is the normal
rule in civil cases. Id. Thus, courts have only two options:
either abide by the normal rule that a decision rendered in a
civil case should be applied retroactively, or, in certain instances, apply the decision purely prospectively. When a new
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rule is applied to the litigants in the case in which the rule
was announced, full retroactive effect must be given to the
new rule. Id. at 535. A purely prospective decision occurs
when a new rule is neither applied to the parties in the lawmaking decision nor to the conduct of others or events that
came before. Id. at 536. The court in Shell Oil applied its
decision to vacate the mixture rule to the parties. 950 F.2d at
952. In light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Beam Distilling, the D.C. Circuit's decision in Shell Oil to vacate the mixture rule should be applied retroactively. See Goodner, 966
F.2d at 386. Hence, the mixture rule was unenforceable from
1980 until 1992.
The court in Shell Oil denied the government's clarification motion, thereby reinforcing the conclusion that the mixture rule was vacated retroactively. The government
specifically requested that the court "clarify" its holding to reflect that the mixture rule was only void prospectively. Shell
Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 80-1532
(D.C. Cir., March 5, 1992)(Order Denying Motion for Clarification). Hence, the court had the perfect occasion to carve out
an exception to the general rule of retroactivity, yet it refrained from doing so.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit in Goodner Bros. rejected EPA's argument that the Shell Oil decision should not
apply retroactively. The court held that a rule has no "force
or effect of law and therefore is void ab initio" when APA notice and comments requirements are not met. 966 F.2d at
384. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that, generally,
regulations not promulgated in accordance with the procedural minimum found in the APA cannot be afforded the
"force and effect of law." Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 313 (1979). Hence, the mixture rule did not exist until it
was correctly promulgated in 1992. Consequently, NURD is
not liable to either EPA or BRANU under the mixture rule
because NURD disposed of the mixture during the period
from 1981 until 1983 - the very time the mixture rule had
no legal effect.
Not only was the mixture rule unenforceable when
NURD disposed of the mixture of prepared roof acid and fruit
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juice, but also when EPA conducted its response action in
1990. Thus, applying the repromulgated mixture rule retroactively would enable EPA to recover costs which NURD was
not liable for at both the time of disposal and at the time of
EPA's expenditures. The Supreme Court has not permitted
this outcome.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that "congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language
requires this result." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488
U.S. 204, 208 (1988). Since EPA's mixture rule does not contain any language requiring a retroactive effect, a retroactive
application of the rule to impose liability on NURD would be
inappropriate. The agency has even conceded that the mixture rule's effect can only be prospective, and thus cannot apply to actions brought before its enactment. In the Matter of
Hardin Cty., OH c/o Hardin County Comm'rs, No. RCRA-VW-89-R-29, 1992 RCRA LEXIS 301, at 14 (ALJ, July 10,
1992). Therefore, to permit EPA to apply the repromulgated
mixture rule retroactively would "make a mockery... of the
APA, [since] agencies would be free to violate the rule making
requirements of the APA with impunity if, upon invalidation
of the rule, they were free to 'reissue' that rule on a retroactive basis." 488 U.S. at 225 (Scalia, concurring).
The invalidation of the mixture rule from 1980 until 1992
will not completely shelter from liability past and present
owners or operators who disposed of hazardous wastes. See
Rebuttal: The Mixture Rule and the Environmental Code, 25
Envtl. L. Rep. 10244 (1995). Although the combination of a
listed waste with other solid wastes before 1992 is neither a
listed waste, nor subject to the mixture rule, it may still be
classified as a characteristic hazardous waste for RCRA liability purposes. Accordingly, a retroactive application of
Shell Oil will not preclude from regulation mixtures that exhibit any EPA-identified hazardous waste characteristics. In
addition, EPA has even recognized that "millions of tons" of
non-characteristic waste mixtures can be managed outside
the hazardous waste system because they pose a relatively
low risk. 57 Fed. Reg. 21450, 21451. Hence, invalidating the
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mixture rule for a brief period will neither harm the environment, nor completely eliminate liability.
NURD, however, is not liable for adding the mixture of
prepared roof acid and fruit juice to the compost pit because it
did not dispose of a characteristic hazardous waste. When
EPA analyzed the soil at the Moll's Gardens site, it found
that the contents of the compost pit did not exhibit any of
EPA-identified hazardous waste characteristics. For these
additional reasons, NURD is not liable under CERCLA § 107
since it did not dispose of a RCRA hazardous waste.
Unmistakably, NURD cannot be liable because the mixture rule had no legal effect during the period from 1981
through 1983 when NURD disposed of the mixture. Since the
mixture rule did not exist when NURD disposed of the prepared roof acid and fruit juice, it was not disposing of a RCRA
hazardous waste. As a result, NURD's conduct does not fit
within the scope of CERCLA § 107 because liability is only
imposed upon past owners if, at the time of disposal, the mixture was a RCRA hazardous waste.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner, New Union Roofing
and Drywall respectfully requests that this Court uphold the
District Court's decision barring EPA and BRANU from recovering under both RCRA § 7002 and CERCLA § 107.
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for Respondent,
New Union Roofing and Drywall
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
TWELFTH CIRCUIT
BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT
)
ASSOCIATES OF NEW UNION
)
(BRANU)
)
v.
)
NEW UNION ROOFING AND
DRYWALL (NURD)

and
UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
v.

) Civ. No. 95-214
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
NEW UNION ROOFING AND
)
DRYWALL
)
Brownfields Redevelopment Associates of New Union
(BRANU) and the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) have appealed the decision of the United
States District Court for the District of New Union that they
cannot recover cleanup costs from New Union Roofing and
Drywall (NURD) under section 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA).
Each party is instructed to brief the following questions:
(1) Is NURD liable to BRANU under RCRA 7002 for
NURD's disposal of the chemical known as "roof acid"?
BRANU answers in the affirmative; NURD and, as amicus,
EPA answer in the negative.
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(2) Is NURD liable to EPA and BRANU under CERCLA
107 for NURD'S disposal of roof acid? BRANU and EPA answer in the affirmative; NURD answers in the negative.
Parties are limited in their briefs to the above issues, but are
not limited to the arguments for their positions raised in the
district court below.
For purposes of briefing and argument, legal authorities may
be cited that date until September 15, 1995, and more recent
legal authorities may not be cited or referred to.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION
BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATES OF NEW UNION
(BRANU)
v.

)
)

NEW UNION ROOFING AND
DRYWALL (NURD)

)
)

)
Civ. No. 93-22,046

and

)
)

)

UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
v.

)
)
)
)

NEW UNION ROOFING AND
DRYWALL
Decision entered April 23,1995

)
)

I.

)

Introduction and Background Facts

New Union Roofing and Drywall (NURD) is a 3-employee
business in Cathertown, New Union. NURD specializes in
careful craftsmanship and painstaking attention to detail in
its work: though its prices are high, NURD always meets its
deadlines and takes pride in the fact that it can list every one
of its former customers as a reference for its work. NURD's
owner, Andrew Peterson, is known throughout the community as a gentleman of old-fashioned values with a refreshing
desire not to sacrifice his personal care in his work. NURD,
pronounced "nerd", has taken advantage of its off-beat acronym in the company slogan on its letterhead: "Remember
high school. NURDs always get the job done right." NURD
has never advertised, and instead gets all of its business from
its prior customers serving as references. NURD has always
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performed all of its business in the same small (1 square
mile) "Moll's Gardens" neighborhood in Cathertown.
NURD was incorporated as a New Union for-profit corporation in 1981 and acquired a vacant lot adjoining the
owner's family home in the Moll's Gardens residential neighborhood. On the lot, NURD constructed, and operated out of,
a modest one-room shed, barely big enough to store its equipment, mix its roofing compounds in drums, and provide a
desk for the owner. From 1981 to 1983, NURD operated its
roofing business from this shed, until moving in 1984 to a site
in Cathertown's industrial area.
The Brownfields Redevelopment Associates of New
Union (BRANU, commonly pronounced "brand new") is a 3
employee for-profit business incorporated in New Union in
1984. Owned by Elizabeth Kates, known for her philosophy
of "think globally and act locally", BRANU's purpose is to find
former industrial-type sites in Cathertown, buy them, perform any necessary environmental remedial action to make
them attractive for new development, and then sell them at a
profit. The firm's letterhead includes its motto: "We recycle
land to make it BRAND NEW!" This is a time consuming
process for each site, and since it was incorporated in 1984,
BRANU has purchased 3 sites: a former dry cleaner, which it
remediated and resold as a photo supply shop; a former gas
station, which is still owned by BRANU and which BRANU
hopes to resell; and the former NURD site. All of the sites are
in the Moll's Gardens neighborhood.
The parties agree on the facts that give rise to dispute,
summarized as follows. During NURD's operations at its
Moll's Gardens site from 1981 to 1983, NURD prepared
batches of "roof acid", a chemical applied to an existing roof to
ease the process of removing old shingles prior to a new roof
being installed. Roof acid is manufactured exclusively from
natural ingredients, including several vegetable extracts, and
is purchased by roofers in powder form and then prepared for
application by adding water to the powder. As mixed with
water, roof acid is listed a hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) im-
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plements in New Union (the State of New Union has not been
authorized by EPA to implement RCRA). Roof acid was listed
as a RCRA hazardous waste on December 31, 1980. On 20 to
30 occasions from 1981 to 1983, NURD prepared more roof
acid than it needed for a particular job, and in these instances
it was NURD's practice to mix the excess roof acid with the
leftover fruit juice prepared for the employees' lunches for the
day and put the resulting mixture into the compost pit, a hole
dug at the back of NURD's site in Moll's Gardens. The parties agree that Peterson and NURD employees did not know
that roof acid was a RCRA listed waste, and mixed the roof
acid with their fruit juice in good faith, believing (mistakenly)
that, because roof acid is prepared from vegetable extracts
and other natural ingredients, it would add nutrients to the
compost and would thus enhance the soil rather than pose
harm. In addition to the mixture of roof acid and soft drinks,
NURD employees also tossed into the compost pit other composting materials, such as autumn leaves, grass clippings,
and food scraps from employees' lunches. The parties have
stipulated that no other materials were disposed of in the
compost pit; that the compost pit is the only source of contamination on the former NURD site; that at all times NURD
used roof acid in quantities small enough to fall below the
thresholds necessary applicable regulations were violated by
NURD at any time during its operations at the Moll's Gardens site. Moreover, the parties stipulate, the roof acid used
was of technical grade; and while discarded roof acid was
listed hazardous waste under RCRA, neither the roof acid
alone nor the mixture which resulted when mixed with soft
drinks qualified as characteristic hazardous waste under
RCRA.
The parties have also stipulated that at the time of
BRANU's purchase of the Moll's Gardens site from NURD in
1990, BRANU did not know and had no reason to know that
any hazardous substance was disposed of in, or at, the site;
that the transfer deed and other documents between NURD
and BRANU are silent as to liability in this instance; and
that no applicable New Union state law is relevant.
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In 1989, as BRANU began clearing the shed from the
property and applying for a Cathertown building permit to
build on the site, a neighbor telephoned the EPA regional office and described seeing NURD employees mixing roof acid
and fruit juices and disposing of them in the compost pit. Andrew Peterson readily acknowledged that this had been
NURD's practice, and both NURD and BRANU fully cooperated with EPA's sampling of soils and groundwater. EPA
spent $100,000 for such sampling and follow-up laboratory
analysis of the samples taken, all in 1990, with a report that
concluded:
A key location on the site has soil that is sufficiently contaminated with roof acid to constitute a danger should the
site be used as residential property is currently in the ownership of a land redevelopment company, federal action to
remediate the soil is not necessary at this time.
BRANU remediated the site spending $200,000, all in
1993. (The site is now remediated and a family lives in the
residence BRANU constructed on the site.) Later in 1993
BRANU commenced this action under RCRA (properly fulfilling the notice requirements of RCRA 7002 (b))2)(A) and
other applicable notice requirements) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and liability
Act (CERCLA) (also properly fulfilling CERCLA's notice requirements). BRANU sought compensation for its response
costs, and at approximately the same time *(and within the
statute of limitations) EPA commenced this action under
CERCLA, seeking recovery of its $100,000 in sampling and
analysis costs. With the consent of the parties, the two cases
have been consolidated, and EPA participates in the RCRA
issues as an amicus.
II. NURD Liability to BRANU Under RCRA 7002
BRANU asserts that NURD is liable to BRANU under
RCRA for restitution of BRANU's $200,000 site remediation
costs under RCRA 7002. NURD asserts that RCRA 7002
does not provide that relief includes restitution, and also that
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RCRA 7002 cannot constitutionally be applied to grand any
relief on these facts. EPA, as amicus, agrees with NURD that
RCRA 7002 does not provide for restitution on these facts,
but for different reasons.
RCRA 7002(a)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part that "any
person may commence a civil action on his won behalf..
against any person... including any past or present generator,.. . or past or present owner or operator of a ...disposal

facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the
past or present... disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." The parties agree that
NURD fits the specified criteria and that, until BRANU
remediated the site in 1993, the site presented an imminent
and substantial endangerment.
What the parties do not agree on is what relief is called
for. BRANU, pointing to RCRA 7002's authorization for the
district court to "order such person to take such other action
as may be necessary", says that this provides to the court its
full equitable powers, and asks for restitution, citing to KFC
Western, Inc. v. Meghrig (49 F.3d 518, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 20638
(9th Cir. 1995) as precedent. See generally J. Martin Robertson, Restitution Under RCRA sec. 7002(a)(1)(B): The Courts
Finally Grant What Congress Authorized, 25 Envtl. L. Rep.
10491 (Sept. 1995).
NURD counters that BRANU and KFC WESTERN read
more into RCRA 7002 than is there, and that under applicable Supreme Court precedent finding implied private causes
of action is disfavored. See generally, John E. Sullivan, Implied Private Causes of Action and the Recoverability of Damages Under the RCRA Citizen Suit Provision,25Envtl. L. Rep.
10408 (Aug. 1995). Moreover, NURD says, the facts in this
case are so local in nature that interstate commerce is not
implicated and so to apply RCRA 7002 to these facts is to exceed Congress' authority to regulate under the Commerce
Clause, citing to United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624
(1995). The parties agree that neither BRANU nor NURD
directly partake of any interstate commerce, except that the
roof acid used by NURD was manufactured in Virginia and
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transported though interstate commerce to a hardware store
in Cathertown, where NURD purchased it. Likewise,
NURD's truck was manufactured in Michigan, and transported through interstate commerce to a dealership in
Cathertown, where NURD bought it. All other supplies were
manufactured and purchased in New Union. The parties
agree that for all supplies used by NURd, including those
make in New Union and the roof acid and truck form other
states, the markets are national with prices set competitively
from many manufacturers. Moreover, the parties agree that
both BRANU and NURD have indirect effects on interstate
commerce to the same extent as any economic activity of their
size though, for example, payments to employees which then
enable employees to purchase goods and services form out of
state, and purchases form suppliers that, though the
purchases were manufactured in New Union, provide profits
to both the suppliers and the manufacturers which enable
them to pay their own employees, who in turn purchase goods
and services in interstate commerce. Simply put, BRANU
suggests that this type of direct and indirect effect on interstate commerce is sufficient under Lopez for RCRA to apply
here, and NURD, pointing to the weapons which were at issue in Lopez, says it is not.
EPA, like BRANU, asserts that the Lopez criteria are
met, but concludes that RCRA 7002 nonetheless does not authorize a private cause of action. EPA acknowledges that
RCA 7002 is quite similar to RCRA 7003, which provides relief when sought by the federal government. Nonetheless,
EPA maintains, though the words are similar, they are not
identical, and moreover under applicable Supreme Court case
law though a high burden must be met to find a private cause
of action from the text of a statute, the burden is lower in
finding a government cause of action. Consequently, EPA
says, RCRA 7003 authorizes restitution when sought by EPA,
but RCRA 7002 does not authorize restitution when sough by
a private party.
This court is unwilling to engage in judicial activism, and
concludes that Congress was within its Commerce Clause authority in enacting RCRA 7002, particularly in light of the
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congressional finding in RCRA 1002(a)(4) that "problems of
waste disposal" "have become a matter national in scope."
However, in enacting RCRA 7002, this court does not believe
that a private cause of action for restitution was created, and
so this court holds that NURD is not liable to BRANU under
RCRA 7002.
III. NURD LIABILITY
CERCLA 107

TO

BRANU

AND

EPA

UNDER

In the alternative to restitution under RCRA 7002,
BRANU asks for cost recovery from NURD under CERCLA
107. EPA asks likewise.
The parties agree that the only CERCLA 107 issue is
whether what NURD disposed of is a "hazardous substance"
for CERCLA liability purposes. CERCLA 101(14) defines
"hazardous substance" by cross-referencing to other provisions; the only provision through which roof acid might be a
hazardous substance is though its listing as a hazardous
waste under RCRA.
BRANU's and EPA's initial reasoning is straightforward:
roof acid is a listed RCRA hazardous waste, which makes it a
hazardous substance under section 101(14), which makes
NURD liable for its disposal under section 107.
But NURD points out that NURD did not dispose of roof
acid, but actually disposed of a mixture of roof acid and fruit
juice left over from lunch, which was prepared in good faith to
add nutrients to a compost pit. The mixture of roof acid and
fruit juice was not a listed waste, and is only hazardous
through EPA's "mixture rule," which states that "a solid
waste ...is a hazardous waste if... [i]t is a mixture of solid

waste and one or more hazardous wastes listed." (40 CFR
261.3).
NURD concedes that if the mixture rule applies, then its
disposal was of a hazardous waste. However, NJRD points
out that the D.C. Circuit vacated the mixture rule in Shell Oil
Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 950 F.2d 741, 22
Envtl. L. Rep. 20305 (D.C. Cir. 1991, as amended 1992).
Although EPA reissued the rule in 1992 (57 Fed. Reg. 7628),
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and stated that the rule was in effect from its initial issuance
in 1980 until the D.C. Circuit vacated it in 1991 (57 Fed. Reg.
at 7630), it is not clear that the rule was indeed in effect during the time of NURD's actions in 1981 through 1983. The
language of the D.C. Circuit opinion does not indicate that
the court envisioned a "discontinuity" in the regulation of
hazardous waste. Likewise, the 8th Circuit has interpreted
the D.C. Circuit's opinion as declaring the mixture rule void
ab initio (United States v. Goodner Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d
380, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. 21201 (1992)).
On whether the mixture rule applied during the 19801991 period, all three parties cite to James E. Satterfield,
EPA's Mixture Rule: Why the Fuss? 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 10712
(Dec. 1994); Van Carson, Philip Schillawski, and Mark Shere,
Rebuttal: The Mixture Rule and the Environmental Code, 25
Envtl. L. Rep. 10244 (May 1995); and James E. Satterfield,
EPA's Continuing Jurisdiction Regulation: A Response to
"The Mixture Rule and the Environmental Code", 25 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10262 (May 1995).
NURD asserts that the roof acid - fruit juice mixture was
not a hazardous waste, and hence not a CERCLA hazardous
substance, in 1981 through 1983, and so NURD is not liable
under CERCLA 107(a)(2). In addition, NURD raises a defense specific to its liability to EPA: NURD points out that if
the mixture rule was invalid, its waste was not hazardous in
1990 when EPA conducted its response action. Thus, NURD
says, although it acknowledges that the mixture rule has
since been properly reissued, applying it retroactively enables EPA to recover from NURD for costs which NURD was
not liable for at both the time of disposal and at the time of
EPA's expenditures.
Both EPA and BRANU assert that the mixture rule was
invalid from its initial issuance in 1980, without interpretation. But they assert differently in the alternative. If the
mixture rule was not valid at the time of NURD's disposal,
BRANU asserts, it is sufficient that it was valid at the time of
BRANU's response action in 1993. EPA asserts that it was
not necessary for the mixture rule to be valid when EPA con-
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ducted its work in 1990, that it is sufficient for the rule to be
applicable when EPA filed its action.
The court believes that NURD is most persuasive here.
The D.C. Circuit was clear that it was vacating the mixture
rule, not merely making it invalid from the date of decision
forward. If the EPA didn't accept the D.C. Circuit's decision,
its responsibility was to take the matter to the Supreme
Court. It is estopped and precluded now, in this court, to assert otherwise. Thus, the mixture was not a hazardous waste
at the time of its disposal, nor, for EPA, at the time of its
cleanup. The court holds NURD is not liable under CERCLA
107.
Orders consistent with this decision are issued herewith.
/s/
R.N. Remus
United States District Judge
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 8,

CLAUSE 3

Section 8. [11 The Congress shall have Power...
[3] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1984)
Citizen Suits
(a) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section,
any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1)(A)
(B) against any person, including the United States
and any other governmental instrumentality or
agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including any past or
present generator, past or present transporter, or past
or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or
disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment; or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator.
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection
shall be brought in the district court for the district in which
the alleged violation occurred or the alleged endangerment
may occur. Any action brought under paragraph (a)(2) of this
subsection may be brought in the district court for the district
in which the alleged violation occurred or in the District
Court of the District of Columbia. The district court shall
have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in contro-
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versy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce the permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or
order, referred to in paragraph (1)(A), to restrain any person
who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B), to order such person to take such other action as
may be necessary, or both, or to order the Administrator to
perform the act or duty referred to in paragraph (2), as the
case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties
under section 6928(a) and (g) of this title.
(e) Costs
The court, in issuing any final order in any action
brought pursuant to this section or section 6976 of this title,
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees) to the prevailing or substantially
prevailing party, whenever the court determines such an
award is appropriate. The court may, if a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is sought, require
the filing of a bond or equivalent security in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1992)
Definitions
For the purpose of this subchapter(14) The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or
substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics
identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act (but not including any waste the
regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act
has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317 (a) of Title 33, (E) any
hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the
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Clean Air Act, and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of
Title 15, ...
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1992)
Liability
(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages;
interest rate; "comparable maturity" date
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this
section(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(4) . . . from which there is a release, or threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by
any other person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects
study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1993)
Definition of hazardous waste
(a) A solid waste, as defined in § 261.2, is a hazardous waste
if.
(2) It meets any of the following criteria:
(iv) It is a mixture of solid waste and one or more hazardous wastes that is listed in subpart D of this part
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and has not been excluded from paragraph (a)(2) of this
section under §§ 260.20 and 260.22 of this chapter;...
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